



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 May 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
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Executive Summary: In May, there were 164 IED events within the Asia-Pacific region, consisting of 79 detonation events, 43 found/cleared events, one hoax event, and 41 cache events. Compared to last month, there was a 62% increase in IED activity and IED-related casualties were three times higher in May than April. May events included a total of 579 devices, compared to 362 in April. There were no reported IED events in Northeast Asia for the 11th straight month.

There were 164 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in May 2018




Icons depict events for May 2018; heat map depicts event density from May 2017 - May 2018



This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

May Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA

In South Asia, IED activity increased from 73 events in April to 103 events in May. Additionally, IED-related casualties more than doubled this month. In Bangladesh, though there was a decrease in IED activity, IED-related casualties increased from one casualty in April to seven casualties in May (**see pg. 9**). In India, there was a 35% increase in IED activity from April, and the IED-related casualties more than doubled to 84 total casualties (**see pg. 10**) due to elections in West Bengal. In Nepal, IED rates were twice as high in May compared to April; however, IED-related casualties remained low, with three casualties (**see pg. 11**).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	72	43	0	246	361
	Year	974	403	27	2316	3720
Event Count	Month	52	29	0	22	103
	Year	466	286	20	239	1011




SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Southeast Asia, IED activity increased from 28 events in April to 61 events in May. Additionally, IED-related casualties were more than five times higher in May than April. In the Philippines, IED activity increased by 53% from April, while IED-related casualties rose sharply from four to 24 (**see pg. 14**). In Thailand, IED activity was 2.5 times higher in May compared to April; however, IED-related casualties decreased from 14 to three (**see pg. 15**). In Indonesia, a 13 to 14 MAY coordinated IED attack resulted in a significant spike in IED-related casualties (68 total casualties) and resulted in a sizeable increase in IED activity (**see pg. 16**).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	36	24	1	158	219
	Year	296	534	13	656	1499
Event Count	Month	27	14	1	19	61
	Year	214	72	8	161	455

NOTE: Starting in April 2018, the APCFC Monthly IED report will include both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	108	67	1	404	580
	Year	1272	937	42	2972	5223
Event Count	Month	79	43	1	41	164
	Year	682	358	30	401	1471


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: 2018 Surabaya City Bombings, Indonesia

The 2018 Surabaya City Bombings were a series of terrorist attacks that centered on the city and spanned the days of 13 - 14 MAY. The bombings, which killed 28 and wounded 57, were by some measures, the deadliest attack Indonesia has experienced since the 2002 Bali bombings. Perhaps the most concerning and unsettling aspect of these events was the involvement of entire families that exhibited a willingness to conduct suicide attacks.

The Dita Uprianto family was responsible for the first set of bombings, which targeted three Christian churches in Surabaya on the morning of 13 MAY. Dita's two teenaged sons were responsible for the attack on the first church. They drove on motorcycles and detonated their VBIEDs as they approached the church's entrance. Fifteen minutes following the attack on the first church, Dita's wife and two pre-teen daughters attacked the second church. After a security officer stopped Dita at the entrance of the church, she detonated her PBIED. Dita's two daughters detonated their PBIEDs immediately after. Shortly following the attack on the second church, Dita triggered his VBIED while sitting in it parked outside a third church.

The Anton Febryanto family was responsible for the second bombing, which was a premature IED detonation that occurred in Anton's apartment in the evening of the 13th. Police suspect Anton might have mishandled an IED with TATP explosives when the detonation occurred. The device killed Anton, his wife, and two of his minor children.

The Tri Murtono family was responsible for the third bombing, which targeted the Surabaya Police Headquarters on the morning of the 14th. Tri Murtono's family approached the entry control point for the Surabaya Police Headquarters on two motorcycles and detonated a VBIED. The blast killed four family members and wounded eight victims, including four police officers.

Investigations into the attacks revealed that the fathers of the families were members of a Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) cell that formed in Surabaya. The unprecedented nature of these attacks may be in some part attributed to the way ISIS (JAD pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015) views the role of women and children, whom they refer to as "lionesses" and "cubs" in their propaganda. Recent publications of Al-Fatihin, a Bahasa Indonesia language pro-ISIS newsletter, has also called for women and children to carry out attacks.

In response to the bombings, Densus 88, Indonesia's premier counterterrorism police, has conducted dozens of raids and killed or captured 41 others in connection to these attacks. They also recovered 149 IEDs from various caches. Although security force operations have likely disrupted the near-term ability of militants to conduct future attacks, the proposition of suicide bombers comprised of families will present a long-term challenge to Indonesian security services.



Dozens of these pipe bombs were recovered from caches in Surabaya City

Sources: Jakarta Post (5/14/18) Lowy Institute (5/15/18) Jakarta Globe (5/15/18) Jatim Now (5/23/18) International Review (5/29/18)

Special Assessment: United Cyber Caliphate

Introduction

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) rise to prominence was a function of its rapid military successes, coupled with the volumes of propaganda distributed by the various hacker collectives and online activists that sought to advance the ISIS ideology. Notwithstanding the benefits of operating beyond the geographic confines of the caliphate and the advantages of global dispersal, the cyber jihadis lacked unity of effort; thus, the associated effectiveness of their cyber campaigns, particularly their ability to launch effective cyber-attacks, were correspondingly insignificant. Though each individual and group conducted operations independently, they shared the common goals of furthering the ISIS ideology via the distribution of jihadi propaganda, of undermining the efforts of the United States and the anti-ISIS coalition through cyber-attacks, and of increasing the number of ISIS adherents through online radicalization activities. The unification of these groups under the banner of the United Cyber Caliphate (UCC) eliminated the fragmentary nature of ISIS's virtual operations and the resultant coordination facilitated the progression of ISIS's cyber jihad. Despite the advantages inherent to the union of the various collectives, the UCC's cyber capabilities remain unsophisticated and do not present an immediate threat. However, as the UCC continues to refine and evolve its cyber capabilities, it will become necessary for the United States and the greater anti-ISIS coalition to monitor this group closely.

Actors

Prior to the establishment of the UCC in April 2016, it was a collective of various independent and semi-organized groups that sought to further the credibility of the ISIS "brand" and to undermine the United States and other governments. Comparable to "Anonymous," the compilation of individuals and organizations operated independently in pursuit of a common objective; however, such a decentralized organizational structure complicated the effectiveness of their actions.

The initial incarnation of ISIS's "Cyber Caliphate" formed after the group's emergence in the summer of 2014. Led by the hacker Junaid Hussain, who was killed by a U.S. air strike in August 2015, the cyber branch's primary responsibility was to ensure the online distribution of extremist propaganda. The reported cyber-attacks conducted by the group were website defacements, such as the compromise of the YouTube and Twitter accounts of U.S. Central Command. The unsophisticated nature of such an activity belies the effects produced by this action. The defacement of the social media accounts of the headquarters responsible for prosecuting the war against ISIS was a noteworthy success for the nascent cyber branch. Simultaneously, other disparate hacking collectives and activists conducted operations on behalf of and in support of ISIS. These groups included the Sons Caliphate Army, the Caliphate Cyber Army, the Ghost Caliphate, and the Kalashnikov Team. The April 2016 unification of these groups under the United Cyber Caliphate eliminated conflicting messaging and actions, but did little to improve the group's overall effectiveness in the cyber domain.



Unification of the United Cyber Caliphate

Targets

The rise of ISIS coincided with the extensive proliferation of telecommunications technologies and the rapid growth in the use of social media applications. From the perspective of propaganda distribution, this enabled the UCC to disseminate high-quality media almost instantaneously. It is thus not surprising that due to the group's adept use of social media, the accounts of competing individuals and organizations emerged as targets. The UCC's attacks consisted of hacks aimed at embarrassing government organizations and government affiliated personnel; primarily members of the U.S. military. Moreover, the group expanded its targeting portfolio to incorporate private businesses and media outlets as well. For instance, following its attack on the social media accounts of U.S. Central Command, the UCC hacked the Twitter account of the weekly magazine Newsweek by replacing the account's official front page graphics with jihadi statements for a period of fourteen minutes. Additionally, in an attack with no apparent political motive, the group defaced the website of Malaysia Airlines, replacing its booking page with the quote "404 – Plane Not Found;" a reference to the loss of two of the airline's aircraft the previous year. Corresponding to the intensification of the military campaign to expel ISIS from Iraq and Syria, the UCC initiated efforts to target U.S. government and military personnel via the public release of so called "hit lists," or listings of these individuals' personal information. Again, these attacks are not a testament to the skill of ISIS's cyber branch, particularly as it obtained the data associated to its August 2015 release of the names and addresses of 1,500 service members from a hacker in Kosovo.

Special Assessment: United Cyber Caliphate

Intentions

The lack of advanced cyber skills constrains the UCC's operations; therefore, the organization's primary goal is to support ISIS through the establishment and furtherance of a "cyber caliphate," or simply stated, to leverage the cyber domain as a tool for recruitment and to spread radical propaganda. Though it is a difficult endeavor to quantify or accurately measure the UCC's pursuit of this objective, the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria from over eighty countries is a testament to the group's ability to co-ordinate the creation and distribution of extremist literature designed to facilitate the establishment of a global ISIS support network.



Defacement of the Malaysia Airline Website

The formal merger of the groups that comprise the UCC underscores the organization's desire to increase the sophistication of its cyber capabilities. The union of these groups likely enhanced the capabilities of the UCC, as each organization contributed its unique expertise. As the group continues to recruit technically savvy individuals and as it realizes parallel advances in the scope of its cyber skills, there will likely be a corresponding evolution of the organization's intentions. Specifically, as the geographic caliphate in Iraq and Syria continues to constrict, the UCC will assume greater responsibility for maintaining and advancing the ISIS "brand" and to ensure that the group remains relevant despite its loss of physical territory. This will require the UCC to execute more advance cyber actions that yield effects far beyond those associated to simple website defacements.

TTPs

An analysis of the available information regarding UCC TTPs reveals that because of the group's low skill level, it relies upon the exploitation of vulnerable targets such as social media accounts and defaces these accounts and their associated sites as its primary means of cyber-attack. Moreover, the UCC has distributed several "hit lists," which consists of the personal information of hundreds to thousands of affected individuals; however, the acquisition of this information was likely not due to the UCC's ability to infiltrate a computer network and to exfiltrate data of interest. Rather, the organization typically acquires this information from alternative sources.

Tools


Experts assess that the UCC lacks the knowledge, expertise, and resources to program customized hacking tools. As such, the group relies upon the acquisition of malware, key loggers, remote access Trojans, and other nefarious cyber systems that are available on the dark web or toolsets sourced from black market venues. Information concerning the specific designations or names of the means employed by the UCC is not known or available.

For the purposes of secure communications, the UCC uses encrypted online systems such as Telegram and WhatsApp; however, the extent of the organization's use of these platforms for the purposes of coordinating and planning cyber actions is not available publicly.

Interestingly, for the purposes of advancing ISIS radicalization and messaging efforts, the UCC developed a Twitter application for Android based systems called "The Dawn of Glad Tidings." Prior to the application's removal from the Google Play store, the program would post tweets from the user's Twitter account that endorsed and magnified ISIS's messages. For instance, prior to and during a major ISIS offensive, the group's posting activity reach a high of 40,000 tweets in a single day.

Sources: MIT Technology Review (September 2015) FlashPoint (April 2016) Ars Technica (4/28/16) Social Science and Public Policy (February 2017) Terrorism Attacks (10/29/17)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Faisal Hasan Mirza		
HOMETOWN: Jogeshwari, Mumbai AGE: 32 AREA OF OPERATION: Mumbai, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh AFFILIATIONS: Dawood Company (D-Company), Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), India Mujahideen (IM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)		
Originally from Mumbai, Faisal Hasan Mirza worked as an electrician prior to his relative (Farooq Davediwala) convincing him to engage in gold smuggling as a way to improve his financial situation. Mirza reportedly never finished school and found it difficult to maintain consistent employment. Davediwala, a logistics lieutenant in D-Company, India's most notorious criminal organization, sent Mirza and another associate, AR Mansuri, to Sharjah, UAE to smuggle gold into India. While in the Middle East, a Dubai-based handler contacted Mirza and convinced him to travel to Pakistan to receive terror training.		
In Pakistan, Mirza received two weeks of militant training that included IED production, fire-arms handling, and knife skills with the ultimate objective of conducting attacks in India. Indian security forces have blamed Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for Mirza's radicalization and have stated that he was in contact with Indian Mujahideen (IM) personnel. Upon his return to India, Mirza set up a small cell in Jogeshwari, where he and some cousins gathered explosives in preparation for IED attacks against government officials in Mumbai, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh. The group planned these attacks for execution in early and late May 2018.		
On 10 MAY, the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad in Mumbai arrested Mirza and charged him under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. During his interrogation, Mirza revealed that he was involved in the planning and coordination of at least seven other attempts to execute fidayeen-style suicide attacks against high profile targets. Mirza's path to recruitment and radicalization indicate that the ISI may be attempting to revitalize IM with the assistance of D-Company. Such actions highlight the increasing emergence of hybrid, criminal-terrorist networks operating in South Asia.		
Sources: DNA India (5/14/18) Latestly (5/14/18) Tribune India (5/14/18) New India Express (5/14/18) Hindustan Times (5/14/18) Financial Express (5/14/18) Mid-Day (5/15/18) DNA India (5/16/18) Hindustan Times (5/16/18) TOI (5/17/18) Mid-Day (5/19/18) DNA India (5/29/18)		
VEO: Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel)		
HEADQUARTERS: Mogbazar, Dhaka IDEOLOGY: Islamist AFFILIATIONS: Bangladesh National Party, Islami Chhatra Shibir, Pakistani Army		
Syed Ab'ul Ala Maududi founded Jel in August 1941, to serve as a platform to promote political and social Islam. When the British partitioned India in 1947, which created the states of West Pakistan and East Pakistan (later to become Bangladesh), Jel established separate branches in each country. During the 1971 War of Independence, Jel continued to support Pakistan, and fought against the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. In the final months of the war, Jel and the Pakistani Army engaged in murder, torture, and systematic rape of Bengali civilians (particularly intellectuals, writers, and teachers) and political opponents. Estimates of those killed range between 300,000 and three million.		
Following the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971, most of Jel's senior leaders fled to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; however, following a military coup and the assassination of Bangladesh's first president, Jel returned and continued their political activities under Major General Ziaur Rahman's regime. Aided by their alliance with Bangladesh National party (BNP), Jel operated as a player in the government until being banned in 2013. The Bangladeshi government, run by the opposing Awami League since 2008, banned Jel and sought to arrest those Jel members involved in crimes committed during the 1971 war.		
Jel, in conjunction with the organization's student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), has been responsible for much of the widespread violence across Bangladesh over the last several years; the BNP has employed the groups to conduct political violence in protest of the Awami League-run government. For example, Jel/ICS conducted hundreds of IED attacks between 2012 and 2015 to protest elections. They commonly use IEDs, bladed weapons, firearms to target civilians (particularly ethnic and religious minorities), politicians, and law enforcement and military.		
Sources: GTD Banglapedia Hindu (7/18/13) al-Jazeera (8/10/17)		

South Asia: May Significant Activity

Bangladesh

On 3 MAY, Dhaka Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit released findings from the detention and interrogation of Akram Hossain Niloy, a senior member of Neo-Jama'at-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB). Originally from Gulshan, Dhaka, Niloy met a Nigerian at Azad Mosque, who eventually contributed to his radicalization. Niloy subsequently radicalized the rest of his family members and intended to travel to the Middle East. Unable to travel to the Middle East due to visa issues, Niloy instead focused on carrying out jihad in Bangladesh. He joined Neo-JMB under Tamim Chowdhury's leadership and helped facilitate the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in July 2016. His arrest in March 2018 represents the increasing capability of CT forces in Bangladesh and was a major victory in the fight against Neo-JMB. **Dhaka Tribune (5/3/18)**

On 18 MAY, leaders of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh expressed concerns over violence associated with upcoming elections, which are set to occur in late 2018 or early 2019. Militant Islamist organizations have historically targeted Hindus and other minority groups during previous election cycles. **Daily Star (5/18/18)**

In late May, police in Chittagong reported that they are investigating Mohammad Sadman Soumik's (a 25-year-old engineer) links to militancy. Sadman disappeared on 23 APR after quitting his job and cutting ties with his friends and family. Similar cases of students and professionals disappearing and turning to militancy have occurred over the last few years. For instance, the Holey Artisan Bakery attackers disappeared months before the attack and officials later discovered that they had been conducting training with senior Neo-JMB leaders ahead of the attack. A similar case occurred earlier this year, when a high school student went missing and months later, died during an anti-militancy drive on 12 JAN. Bangladeshi authorities have been more closely tracking missing person cases as a result of these precedents. **Daily Star (5/19/18)**

Since 12 MAY, law enforcement officers reportedly killed 105 suspected drug dealers as a part of a nation-wide counterdrug campaign. The drug dealers were allegedly involved in gunfights with law enforcement, leading to their deaths. Law enforcement arrested many other drug dealers as a part of these actions, though government officials have yet to release the specific numbers. Authorities also recovered caches containing weapons (guns and bladed weapons) and illegal drugs (such as Yaba and marijuana). **Prothom Alo (5/28/18)**

India

On 2 MAY, the Indian Army and Malaysian Army conducted their first-ever joint military exercise, "Harimau Shakti," at Wardieburn Camp, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. During the two-week long military exercise, Indian and Malaysian army units operated under one commander. **Bihaprabha (5/3/18)**

As of 21 MAY, the Jammu and Kashmir Police will reportedly procure new equipment, such as vehicle surveillance systems, metal detectors, explosive detectors, and small-unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) equipped with night vision devices. With the recent increase in militancy-related incidents, senior police officials justified the need for new equipment as a requirement to execute more effective anti-militant operations, particularly in the Kashmir Valley. **NDTV (5/21/18)**


As of 24 MAY, a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) senior special adviser expressed concern that while India's Maoist insurgency is failing, there may be a spike in IED activity as militants attempt to evade capture and adopt a more defensive posture. Maoists have been steadily losing their hold over territories under their control, preventing them from conducting as many ambushes; thus, as a means to remain relevant, they will likely increasingly rely more on IEDs. Senior political experts assessed that a spike in IED activity was possible, indicating that the Maoists are in retreat. **Hindustan Times (5/24/18)**

On 24 MAY, Odisha police raised concerns that the use of asphalt to pave key roads could make them more vulnerable to IED attacks, as Maoists can easily emplace IEDs under roads using this material. In particular, they objected to the use of asphalt in the construction of the approach roads to the Gurupriya Bridge, which is nearing completion in Maoist-affected Malkangiri District. This represents one of the many infrastructure projects underway in Maoist-affected areas. Proposed mitigation measures include constructing the roads out of concrete to make it more difficult to emplace IEDs and the installation of CCTV cameras in the area. **Times of India (5/24/18)**

Nepal

On 11 MAY, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Nepal for a two-day visit with Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Prime Ministers Oli and Modi discussed promoting stronger ties through the concept of "neighborhood first," which is likely in response to China's growing influence in Nepal. Meanwhile, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) activists called a nation-wide banda (blockade) and conducted several arson and IED attacks across the country. The blockade was successful in some areas, as it kept schools and business shut and prevented vehicular movement. **Kathmandu Post (5/14/18)** **Indian Express (5/12/18)**

Bangladesh: May IED Events



There were two IED detonation events and four IED cache events.

On 13 MAY, seven to eight assailants threw IEDs at local political organizers in Palbari, Jessore, Khulna, wounding two civilians. The assailants then attacked one of the wounded with bladed weapons. The victim later died from his injuries. The two political organizers were campaigning for the Torun League and the Jubo League. **Daily Star (5/14/18) BDNews24 (5/14/18)**

On 24 MAY, suspected drug dealers threw crude bombs at local police forces in an attempt to free their detained associate in Ishwardi, Pabna, Rajshahi; five policemen injured. Police arrested the known drug dealer as part of a nationwide anti-drug drive. **Independent BD (5/24/18)**


On 28 MAY, local police recovered an IED cache following a gunfight with a suspected drug dealer in Boichatory, Chandpur, Chittagong. The cache contained 111 yaba (methamphetamine and caffeine) tablets, three crude bombs, one pistol, and four bullets. **Bangladesh Post (5/28/18)**

In May, IED activity dropped slightly in Bangladesh with levels remaining consistently low over the last several months. The majority of IED activity in May is attributable to the nationwide counterdrug campaign that has been responsible for over 100 deaths in the last three weeks (see **South Asia SIGACTs**).


Surprisingly, there were no JMB or Neo-JMB IED events in Bangladesh this month, despite the arrests of JMB and Neo-JMB members (including the high-profile arrest of Neo-JMB planner, Niloy). There was, however, a large JMB explosives cache recovered in Murshidabad, India that was reportedly going to be shipped to Bangladesh. The cache contained thousands of gel sticks and detonators. The interception of this cache may be the reason that there were no JMB-related IED events in Bangladesh in May. Evidence also surfaced that JMB and Hizbul Mujahideen may be recruiting minority Muslims in Assam, India for operations (see **South Asia SIGACTs**).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	8	0	0	21	29
	Year	48	10	1	223	282
Event Count	Month	2	0	0	4	6
	Year	24	7	1	52	84


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: May IED Events



There were 35 IED detonation events, 13 IED found and cleared events, and 18 IED cache events.

On 14 MAY, multiple IED events occurred at polling stations across West Bengal State. There were at least three deaths and 39 injuries reportedly caused by IEDs thrown at voters and political rivals. Officials blamed the attacks, as well as the theft of ballot boxes, on Trinamool Congress (TMC) activists. **Daily Pioneer (5/16/18)**

On 20 MAY, Maoists detonated a large IED against a police vehicle containing a team of Chhattisgarh Armed Forces and District Forces in Dantewada that resulted in six deaths. The IED was buried beneath the road and detonated while security forces were escorting another vehicle carrying material for road construction work. **Business Standard (5/20/18)**


On 25 MAY, police recovered an IED cache following the arrest of suspected militants for detonating grenades in Chattabal and Baripora Safakadal. The cache contained 1.1kg of RDX, detonators, a Chinese grenade, and a Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen (TuM) flag. An investigation revealed that one of the suspects was in contact with a Pakistan-based TuM handler, who promised monetary benefits in exchange for conducting attacks against security forces and "sensitive places" in the city. **The New Indian Express (5/26/18)**

In May, IED activity throughout India increased significantly over the previous month, primarily due to political violence in the West Bengal region. Most of the events involved thrown IEDs (often crude bombs) targeting political rivals and civilian voters. Additionally, violent demonstrations and poll box thefts plagued polling sites.

In the Red Corridor, Maoist activity was lower than usual; however, Maoists continue to target construction sites in the region (see SA SIGACTs). Recent increases in IED interdictions and Maoist insurgent surrenders seem to support the claim that the insurgency is weakening. Investment by the government into infrastructure projects also increases the capability for security forces to secure previous Maoist strongholds, as there is a greater governmental presence in areas historically under militant influence. In retribution, Maoists have been targeting security forces in vicinity of construction sites with increased frequency. As Maoists continue to loose territory, it is likely that they will retreat to forest areas for the planning and facilitation of future operations.


Near the end of May, the Jammu and Kashmir region observed an increase in activity. In addition to IED events, there were also multiple grenade attacks. Attacks using conventional munitions (including small arms) are more common and cause more casualties than the IEDs that are currently deployed in the area. Security forces' plans to utilize new technologies could help mitigate the threats from both IEDs and conventional munitions.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	49	26	0	225	300
	Year	710	207	8	2064	2989
Event Count	Month	35	13	0	18	66
	Year	258	107	9	162	536



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: May IED Events



There were 15 IED detonation events and 16 IED found and cleared events.


On 5 MAY, suspects detonated a pressure cooker IED near the residence of Vice Mayor Iman Singh Lama in Rapti, Chitwan, Narayani. Attacks targeting elected officials have become increasingly common since the 2017 elections. **Nepal Monitor (5/5/18)**

On 12 MAY, CPN-M militants detonated a pressure cooker IED at Mahima Church in Dhangadhi-4, Kailali, Seti. This was one of five churches targeted by militants; the other four were attacked by arsonists. **Gorkha Post (5/13/18) Sight (5/17/18)**

On 13 MAY, CPN-M militants targeted buses in Jhapa, Mechi. Militants threw two IEDs at parked buses in Mechinagar-8 and authorities also recovered an IED from the Damak Bus Park. Police detained one suspect in connection to the events. **Nepal Monitor (5/13/18) Kathmandu Post (5/13/18)**

IED events in May nearly doubled from April, due primarily to violence committed by the CPN-M prior to and during the official visit of Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. In particular, militants targeted infrastructure projects and transportation means (such as buses and the Pokhara Airport). These actions are likely components of the CPN-M's approach to attempt to enforce a transportation blockade and to shut down schools and local businesses in protest of Modi's visit. The Nepal Army EOD was the primary response force, with nearly half the events in May being found and cleared. In the coming months, it is likely that IED events will remain elevated as the CPN-M continues to attempt to undermine the Nepalese government's increasing emphasis on industry and infrastructure development.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	15	17	0	0	32
	Year	216	186	18	29	449
Event Count	Month	15	16	0	0	31
	Year	184	172	10	24	390



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: May Significant Activity

Philippines

From 13-14 MAY, the government held local elections for barangay leadership and the Sangguniang Kabataan (Youth Councils) for the first time in five years (of note, there are 42,044 barangays across the country). The NPA and BIFF attempted to disrupt the elections by detonating IEDs and conventional munitions around polling centers in an effort to scare and intimidate voters. Their efforts were largely unsuccessful, as voting completed at all 73,562 polling centers, with the exception of one location. Compared to the last barangay elections in 2013, overall violence decreased (there were 57 violent incidents in 2013 and only seven violent incidents recorded thus far in this election cycle). In order to preempt violence, police confiscated firearms, ammunition, explosive devices, ramped up patrols in known trouble spots, and imposed a gun and alcohol ban 48 hours before the opening of polls. **GMA News (5/14/18) Rappler (5/14/18)**

The one-year anniversary of the Marawi Siege (23 MAY) witnessed both protests, particularly in response to governmental delays in the rebuilding and resettlement of the population, and peace gestures by citizens and officials. While Manila called for patience with the rebuilding efforts, at least 15 percent of the city remains uninhabitable and UXO clearing operations have yet to commence. Additionally, thousands of Marawi residents remain in temporary shelters. **Davao Today (5/23/18) Gulf Times (5/23/18) PhilStar (5/23/18)**

On 30 MAY, the Philippine Congress approved the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), a peace initiative between the Moro people and the Philippine government that has been 15 years in the making. President Duterte, who is expected to sign it into law after the two Congressional chambers' versions are reconciled, strongly supports the legislation. The intent of the BBL is to allow for broader self-governance in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. It was part of the peace agreement signed with the Moro Islamic Liberation front (MILF) in 2014, but was never passed by the former president amid an uptick in violence in 2014-2015. Following, President Duterte has supported the BBL as part of a process he believes will help heal historical injustices inflicted upon the Moro people of the area. **ABS-CBN News (5/30/18)**

Burma

On 12 MAY, in Muse and Sai Kyaw Thein (northeastern Myanmar near the border of China), roughly 100 insurgents from the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) launched an attack using small arms and artillery that lasted approximately three hours. The attack resulted in 15 civilians, three soldiers, and a police officer killed and 29 injured. The insurgents claimed the attack was targeting soldiers and militia members who ran a casino, which corresponds to the group's stance against drug production and distribution. The TNLA and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) both blame the government for the ongoing oppression of ethnic minorities and refuse to enter into peace talks. **Sydney Morning Herald (5/13/18)**

In May, there were three incidents of landmine detonations targeting rail infrastructure, which damaged tracks and caused significant delays in areas that have already been heavily impacted by clashes between the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) and various rebel groups. The militants have used landmines and IEDs in the region to target security forces and to foment public disorder. Recent increases in the number of clashes have caused thousands of civilians to become displaced throughout Burma. Moreover, fears about the use of landmines on civilian infrastructure have contributed to growing concerns for safety and stability. NOTE: While it is likely that the May landmine detonations were of a conventional nature, other countries in Southeast Asia often use the term "landmine" to refer to IEDs. **Myanmar Times (5/17/18) Mizzima (5/17/18) Garda (5/17/18)**

Thailand

On 2 MAY, the Internal Security Operations Command (Isoc) Region 4 and Pattani Police announced that the Pattani Court recently sentenced six individuals to death for their involvement in several bombings that occurred between June and December 2016, which killed two people and injured more than 20. The Pattani Court also sentenced three others to life in prison and another received a 40-year prison sentence. According to sources, Thailand has not carried out the death penalty in more than eight years. **The Nation (5/3/18) News24 (5/3/18) Thai Visa (5/3/18)**

On 15 MAY, Rangers identified a sUAS flying above their security post in Ba-ngoy Sinae, Yaha, Yala. The drone flew away when officials shined a spotlight on it. Officials suspect that the drone was conducting reconnaissance for the grenade attack that occurred approximately one hour later. **Bangkok Post (5/15/18)**


Southeast Asia: May Significant Activity

Indonesia

In late May, Indonesia passed a new anti-terrorism law, following years of deliberation. The imposition of the new law follows the Surabaya bombings (**see Incident Highlight**) and comes after two years of repeated calls for reform by President Joko Widodo and protracted deliberations by the Indonesian parliament. The new law extends detention periods, provides a new legal authority for the military to engage in approved counterterrorism operations, and addresses gaps from the original law signed in 2003. The legislation provides a legal basis to prosecute radical clerics who inspire attacks, individuals who engage in militant training with the intent to commit acts of terrorism, and Indonesians who travel abroad to join ISIS. The new law also allows police to detain terror suspects for up to 21 days without pressing charges; three times as long as the law previously allowed. Additionally, after being charged, police can now detain suspects for 290 days to allow time to gather evidence before handing the case to prosecutors (this is almost twice as long as the law previously allowed). The new law also broadens the definition of terrorism, which was one of the divisive issues and key obstacles to the passing of the law. The law now defines terrorism as “acts of violence or threats that give rise to an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, which can lead to mass casualties, and/or cause damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities, with motives related to ideology, politics, or security disorder.” Human rights activists have expressed concern that the expanded terrorism definition is too broad and that the new legal authorities provided by the law could increase the propensity for human rights abuses. Police Chief Tito Karnavian, however, argued that the new law provides much needed authority to more effectively neutralize terrorist networks. **Indonesia Investments (5/25/18) The Jakarta Post (5/25/18) Reuters (5/24/18) ABC News (5/24/18)**

From 8-9 MAY, Indonesia experienced a riot at a high security prison in Depok, West Java. The near 40-hour ordeal at the Mako Brimob prison started when a terrorism suspect named Wawan Kurniawan burst into a rage after guards denied him the food his wife had sent. The fury quickly spread through the three cell blocks holding terror suspects. Inmates then forced their way into secure areas of the facility, including an evidence room from which they seized dozens of firearms and sharp weapons. Police used a combination of negotiation and later, tear gas to end the siege. The riot resulted in the deaths of five and the wounding of four police officers from the elite counterterrorism squad, Densus 88. The death toll was the highest suffered in a single event by Densus 88 since its inception in 2003. Following the riot, Indonesian prison expert, Leopold Sudaryono, highlighted the inadequacies of the Brimob facility, which includes thin walls and locked gates of an insufficient strength between various sections. The number of guards was also an issue. When violence erupted on Tuesday evening, only 13 officers were on duty to oversee 156 terror suspects spread among 42 cells. **Lowry Institute (5/28/18) Reuters (5/9/18)**

Philippines: May IED Events



There were eight IED detonation events, seven IED found and cleared events, and 11 IED cache events.

On 1 MAY, police recovered two IED caches from suspected Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) members in Culianan, Zamboanga, Zamboanga del Sur, Mindanao; two detained. Police recovered one cache from the suspects' van and another from their hideout. The cache contained an unspecified amount of IEDs, four improvised non-electric blasting caps, four LED lights (red and yellow), one toggle switch, three resistors, one tester, 12-volt Christmas light bulbs, and one 500ml bottle of mineral water. **Mindanao Examiner (5/2/18)** **Zamboanga Today (5/3/18)**

On 11 MAY, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) detonated an RCIED near an elementary school in Tugak, Midsayap, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Mindanao. The BIFF constructed the device from an 81-mm mortar placed inside a plastic container with metal sheets, and detonated it via cellphone. **Inquirer (5/11/18)** **Manila Bulletin (5/12/18)**


On 18 MAY, New People's Army (NPA) rebels detonated a CWIED on a bridge in Palalian, Kalawit, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Peninsula, Mindanao; two soldiers sustained injuries. An Army Battalion spotted the NPA rebels laying the device on the bridge prior to the detonation, resulting in an exchange of small arms fire between the two groups. Philippine army personnel recovered 100 meters of wire, three 9V batteries, and shrapnel following the detonation. **Sun Star Zamboanga (5/19/18)** **Inquirer (5/19/18)**

A surge of election violence contributed to an increase in IED activity in May; however, activities undertaken by security forces (e.g. increased patrols, traffic control point operations, the confiscation of arms and explosives, etc.) contributed to a rather uneventful election cycle (**see SEA SIGACTs**). Simultaneously, security force actions pressured VEOs, which resulted in several captures, cache finds, and surrenders. Meanwhile, combined military and police operations resulted in the capture/neutralization of key insurgent leaders from both the Abu Sayyaf Group and the NPA this month.


The fallout from the Marawi siege continues to cause concerns in the southern Philippines. Civil strife and the perceived sluggishness regarding government-rebuilding efforts raise fears that this will create an opening for the resurgence of VEOs. The prolonged state of martial law in Mindanao is another irritant that VEOs can leverage, even as expanded security operations have splintered groups and constrained their ability to execute complex conventional attacks. This increased pressure by security forces has prompted militants to rely upon IED attacks as a primary means for offensive operations.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	9	8	0	16	33
	Year	92	464	0	279	835
Event Count	Month	8	7	0	11	26
	Year	84	38	0	113	235


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: May IED Events



There were 14 IED detonation events, five IED found and cleared events, and one IED cache event.

On 4 MAY, two IEDs detonated as part of a coordinated attack in Tak Bai, Narathiwat damaging electrical poles. The detonation coincided with arson attacks carried out in Bancho, Rusoh, Sungai Kolo and Sungai Padi; no casualties reported. The arson attacks destroyed tires, communication cables and other infrastructure. Also in Tak Bai, officials discovered two pipe bombs with a digital watch attached to a power pole. Technicians performed render safe procedures using a water gun. **Bangkok Post (5/4/18) The Nation (5/4/18)**

On 19 MAY, local police recovered an IED cache in Bangoyae village, Sungai Padi, Narathiwat. Police identified two suspects on a motorcycle who bypassed a security checkpoint without stopping. During the pursuit by local police, the suspects disposed of a plastic bag containing four pipe bombs. The suspects then fled into Malaysia. **Bangkok Post (5/20/18)**


On 20 MAY, militants conducted a complex, coordinated attack in several locations across Narathiwat, Yala, Songkhla and Pattani targeting ATMs at various banks. There were approximately 20 detonations and security forces rendered safe two devices. The attacks injured three. Security forces state that they have detained six suspects. **Bangkok Post (5/29/18) The Nation (5/23/18) Bangkok Post (5/23/18) Bangkok Post (5/20/18)**

Thailand's IED activity in May spiked significantly. During this month, the country witnessed the highest rate of IED activity since April 2017. The coordinated attack on 20 MAY contributed to the increase in events and occurred on the fourth day of the observation of Ramadan. May experienced two coordinated attacks that support the initial observation of a growing trend of IED actions that target public areas that contain dense concentrations of civilian activity. Coordinated attacks remain one of the most effective tactics used by southern insurgents to create public unrest and to maximize damage to infrastructure and local economies. Militants will likely continue to employ these tactics in future IED events in Southern Thailand.


In a rare sUAS event on 15 MAY, militants used a drone to conduct surveillance prior to executing a grenade attack on Rangers at their security post (**see SEA SIGACTs**). Although this event is the first reported of its kind in southern Thailand, it is an emerging TTP that could likely reappear, particularly due to the ease of access to commercial sUAS platforms.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	18	9	0	0	27
	Year	94	25	2	17	138
Event Count	Month	14	5	0	1	20
	Year	78	17	2	10	107


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Indonesia: May IED Events



There were five IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, one hoax IED event, and six IED cache events.

On 4 MAY, Densus 88 recovered an IED cache in Bogor, West Java in conjunction with the arrests of three suspected terrorists. The cache contained the following: acetone (CH₃), hydrogen peroxide (H₂O₂), mercury to act as a catalyst, a plastic bottle, a soldering unit, wires, tin, wood shavings for ignition, one Advan tablet, one set of screwdrivers, and one wire switch. Police suspect that the terrorists were intending to create TATP-based explosives. **Neutral News (5/7/18)**


From 13-14 MAY, a series of bombings in Surabaya City targeting Christian churches and the Surabaya City Police headquarters killed 28 and wounded 57 (**see Incident Highlight**).

On 15 MAY, Indonesian police and a Gegana bomb squad recovered a hoax IED at the Transmart Carrefour Lampung shopping center in Bandar Lampung, Lampung. Indonesian police responded to the incident after receiving a telephone call from a Transmart employee, who stated that there was a suspicious package in the bathroom. The bomb squad unit x-rayed the device, revealing it was a hoax, as it did not contain a power source, an initiator, or a switch. Officials described the hoax device as a package wrapped in brown duct tape with branched cables sticking out. **Tribun News (5/15/18) Viva (5/16/18)**


The timing of the Surabaya attacks is interesting, as Aman Abdurrahman, the overall leader of JAD, is standing trial for his involvement in orchestrating the 2016 Jakarta bombings. Surprisingly, Aman used his trial to publicly denounce the Surabaya attacks, which had been conducted by a cell of JAD militants. During the trial, Aman proclaimed that, "What happened in Surabaya, where a mother took her children to blow themselves up, could never be the action of a person who understands Islam and jihad." It is undetermined if Aman was sincere or hoping that the public statement would lessen the possible sentence that he would face. The audio recording has reportedly angered ISIS supporters in Indonesia, who have called to block dissemination of Aman's message. Indonesian counterterrorism experts have noted that the response from ISIS supporters could indicate that he has damaged his legacy or standing with Islamic extremists, as up to this point, Aman has been one of the most radical and influential extremist voices in Indonesia.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	9	7	1	142	159
	Year	15	8	1	240	264
Event Count	Month	5	2	1	6	14
	Year	11	3	2	15	31

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Malaysia: May IED Events





There was one IED cache event.

On 8 MAY, a team of Malaysian Navy personnel recovered an IED cache after stopping a pump boat they observed in the waters near Lahad Datu, Sabah heading towards Sibutu, Tawi-Tawi, Philippines. The Navy personnel discovered a cache that contained 10,000 detonation caps (89 boxes of CDET Alfa). **The Sun Daily (5/8/18)**

Although the media did not indicate the intended purpose of the 10,000 detonation caps, historical use and TTPs suggest that fishermen in the Philippines would likely use them to construct blast-fishing devices. Of note, CDET is an Indian commercial explosives manufacturer.

The enhanced security posture by Malaysia's Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM), combined with the trilateral maritime patrol arrangement between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines has been effective in deterring the kidnapping threat in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas. The 8 MAY event demonstrates that these operations may also have a second-order effect on reducing smuggling activity along historical trafficking routes in the tri-border region.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
	Year	7	1	1	54	63
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	5	1	1	7	14



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: May Significant Activity

China

On 19 MAY, the China Islamic Association, a Chinese government-affiliated body, promulgated a new national religious regulatory guidance on its website following the onset of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting and prayer. The new regulation requires all mosques to display the Chinese flag in a prominent position and to incorporate Chinese studies into teachings. An additional regulation implemented this year includes the requirement for all Islamic students in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to sign a form agreeing to abstain from fasting (parents are also required to abstain from fasting in front of their children). As well as displaying the flag, the guidance instructs mosques to display and teach core socialist values and Chinese constitutional and religious regulations.

In the last few years, China has been steadily tightening control over all religions in China, with particular emphasis on Islam. These new religious controls correspond with Chinese state efforts to reduce the perceived threat of Islamic extremism amongst the Uighur population of XUAR. These measures are in addition to other population controls imposed on the Uighurs, which include biometrics and public camera monitoring, forced re-education in camps, and mandatory weeklong stays of state officials in Uighur homes. A sharper focus on Uighur activities and the policing of all religious activities as Ramadan starts, challenges the Uighurs' ability to adhere to the fundamental tenants of Islam. Additionally, the Uighur population has accused the Chinese government of forcing Uighur prisoners to intentionally violate Islamic religious practices. For instance, in May, Uighurs released by the government following months of incarceration recounted stories of the involuntary eating of pork and the drinking of alcohol as part of the government's efforts to challenge their Islamic identities. **Washington Post (5/20/18) RFA (5/21/18) Daily Mail (5/21/18) Hong Kong Free Press (5/22/18)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

5 MAY (IND): Pooram Day

16 MAY (WW): Ramadan begins

28 MAY (IND): Anniversary of 2002 Kaluchak Attack

29 MAY (NEP): National Day

9 JUN (BUR): Anniversary of Ceasefire of KIA

9-15 JUN (IND): Jan Pituri Week

14 JUN (WW): Ramadan Ends

13 JUL (INDO): Anniversary of Marriot-Ritz bombing

28 JUL - 3 AUG (IND): Martyr's Weeks

IND – India
INDO – Indonesia
THA – Thailand
NEP – Nepal
BUR – Burma
WW – Worldwide

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
May 2018	29	30	1	2	3	4	5 IND
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	13	14	15 WW	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW
	20 WW	21 WW	22 WW	23 WW	24 WW	25 WW	26 WW
	27 WW	28 IND WW	29 NEP WW	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW
	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW	7 WW	8 WW	9 IND BUR WW
June 2018	10 IND WW	11 IND WW	12 IND WW	13 IND WW	14 IND WW	15 IND	16
	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
July 2018	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	8	9	10	11	12	13 INDO	14
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28 IND
	29 IND	30 IND	31 IND	1 IND	2 IND	3 IND	4

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate
 ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
 ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
 CIV – Civilian
 CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
 COIN – Counter-insurgency
 CWIED – Command Wire IED
 DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
 EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile
 EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 F/C – Found & Cleared
 HME – Homemade Explosives
 HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)
 IDF – Indirect Fire
 IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
 IED – Improvised Explosive Device
 KFR – Kidnap for Ransom
 KIA – Killed in Action
 LOC – Line of Communication
 LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas
 MSR – Main Supply Routes
 NFI – No Further Information
 NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report
 PBA – Post Blast Analysis
 PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED

PCB – Printed Circuit Board
 PN – Partner Nation
 PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
 QRF – Quick Response Force
 RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
 RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
 RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
 SA – South Asia
 SAF – Small Arms Fire
 SEA – Southeast Asia
 SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
 TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
 TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C₇H₅N₃O₆)
 TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
 UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
 VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
 VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
 VOIED – Victim Operated IED
 WIA – Wounded in Action

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group
 BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
 BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani
 BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate
 BSF – Border Security Forces
 BNP – Bangladesh National Party
 BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)
 CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)
 CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
 CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
 CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)
 GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani
 HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
 HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)
 HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
 IB – India's Intelligence Bureau
 IM – Indian Mujahideen
 IrW – Irregular Warfare
 ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
 ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham
 JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid
 JI – Jemaah Islamiya
 JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
 JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed

JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
 JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
 KIA – Kachin Independence Army
 KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
 KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
 LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
 MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
 MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
 MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
 NPA – New People's Army
 PNP – Philippine National Police
 POLRI – Indonesian National Police
 PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
 RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
 RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
 SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
 SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
 UWSA – United Wa State Army
 YCL – Youth Communist League